Revert to gl_dither cvar

[xonotic/darkplaces.git] / crypto.c

diff --git a/crypto.c b/crypto.c
index 21b70954fc9045e163faf138591ece7bc0828051..d910e4919f3033391a26205c63500abfeb631378 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto.c
+++ b/crypto.c
@@ -1141,11 +1141,11 @@ static void Crypto_KeyGen_Finished(int code, size_t length_received, unsigned ch
        {
                if(length_received >= 5 && Crypto_LittleLong((const char *) buffer) == FOURCC_D0ER)
                {
-                       Con_Printf("Error response from keygen server: %.*s\n", (int)(length_received - 5), buffer + 5);
+                       Con_Printf(CON_ERROR "Error response from keygen server: %.*s\n", (int)(length_received - 5), buffer + 5);
                }
                else
                {
-                       Con_Printf("Invalid response from keygen server:\n");
+                       Con_Printf(CON_ERROR "Invalid response from keygen server:\n");
                        Com_HexDumpToConsole(buffer, (int)length_received);
                }
                keygen_i = -1;
@@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ static int Crypto_SoftClientError(char *data_out, size_t *len_out, const char *m
        return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
 }
 
-int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
+int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *peeraddressstring)
 {
        crypto_t *crypto = &cls.crypto;
        const char *string = data_in;
@@ -2214,7 +2214,12 @@ int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out,
 
                // Must check the source IP here, if we want to prevent other servers' replies from falsely advancing the crypto state, preventing successful connect to the real server.
                if (net_sourceaddresscheck.integer && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.connect_address))
-                       return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "challenge message from wrong server");
+               {
+                       char warn_msg[128];
+
+                       dpsnprintf(warn_msg, sizeof(warn_msg), "ignoring challenge message from wrong server %s", peeraddressstring);
+                       return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, warn_msg);
+               }
 
                // if we have a stored host key for the server, assume serverid to already be selected!
                // (the loop will refuse to overwrite this one then)
@@ -2422,7 +2427,12 @@ int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out,
 
                // Must check the source IP here, if we want to prevent other servers' replies from falsely advancing the crypto state, preventing successful connect to the real server.
                if (net_sourceaddresscheck.integer && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.connect_address))
-                       return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0pk\\ message from wrong server");
+               {
+                       char warn_msg[128];
+
+                       dpsnprintf(warn_msg, sizeof(warn_msg), "ignoring d0pk\\ message from wrong server %s", peeraddressstring);
+                       return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, warn_msg);
+               }
 
                cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
                id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);