// our SHA is SHA-256
#define SHA_DIGESTSIZE 32
-const char *sha(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+const unsigned char *sha(unsigned char *h, const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
- static __thread char h[32];
- d0_blind_id_util_sha256(h, (const char *) in, len);
+ d0_blind_id_util_sha256((char *) h, (const char *) in, len);
return h;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_INITIALIZE(void)
{
USINGTEMPS();
+ d0_initfuncs();
tempmutex = d0_createmutex();
LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_INITIALIZE());
return NULL;
}
+// temps must NOT be locked when calling this
static D0_BOOL d0_dl_generate_key(size_t size, d0_bignum_t *G)
{
- // using: temp0
+ USINGTEMPS(); // using: temp0
if(size < 16)
size = 16;
for(;;)
{
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(temp0, size-1));
if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp0, 0) == 0)
continue;
continue;
if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp0, 10) == 0) // finish the previous test
continue;
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
break;
}
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
-static D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key(size_t size, const d0_bignum_t *challenge, d0_bignum_t *d, d0_bignum_t *n)
+// temps must NOT be locked when calling this
+static D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key(size_t size, d0_blind_id_t *ctx)
{
- // uses temp0 to temp4
+ USINGTEMPS(); // uses temp1 to temp4
int fail = 0;
int gcdfail = 0;
int pb = (size + 1)/2;
pb = 8;
if(qb < 8)
qb = 8;
+
+ // we use ctx->rsa_d for the first result so that we can unlock temps later
for (;;)
{
- CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(temp0, pb));
- if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp0, 10) == 0)
+ LOCKTEMPS();
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(ctx->rsa_d, pb));
+ if(d0_bignum_isprime(ctx->rsa_d, 10) == 0)
+ {
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
continue;
- CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp2, temp0, one));
- CHECK(d0_bignum_gcd(temp4, NULL, NULL, temp2, challenge));
+ }
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp2, ctx->rsa_d, one));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_gcd(temp4, NULL, NULL, temp2, ctx->rsa_e));
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp4, one))
break;
if(++gcdfail == 3)
goto fail;
++gcdfail;
}
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
+
gcdfail = 0;
for (;;)
{
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(temp1, qb));
- if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp1, temp0))
+ if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp1, ctx->rsa_d))
{
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
if(++fail == 3)
goto fail;
+ continue;
}
fail = 0;
if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp1, 10) == 0)
+ {
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
continue;
+ }
CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp3, temp1, one));
- CHECK(d0_bignum_gcd(temp4, NULL, NULL, temp3, challenge));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_gcd(temp4, NULL, NULL, temp3, ctx->rsa_e));
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp4, one))
+ {
+ // we do NOT unlock, as we still need temp1 and temp3
break;
+ }
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
if(++gcdfail == 3)
goto fail;
++gcdfail;
}
- // n = temp0*temp1
- CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(n, temp0, temp1));
+ // ctx->rsa_n = ctx->rsa_d*temp1
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(ctx->rsa_n, ctx->rsa_d, temp1));
- // d = challenge^-1 mod (temp0-1)(temp1-1)
+ // ctx->rsa_d = ctx->rsa_e^-1 mod (ctx->rsa_d-1)(temp1-1)
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp2, ctx->rsa_d, one)); // we can't reuse the value from above because temps were unlocked
CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(temp0, temp2, temp3));
- CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_inv(d, challenge, temp0));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_inv(ctx->rsa_d, ctx->rsa_e, temp0));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
+// temps must NOT be locked when calling this
static D0_BOOL d0_rsa_generate_key_fastreject(size_t size, d0_fastreject_function reject, d0_blind_id_t *ctx, void *pass)
{
- // uses temp0 to temp4
+ USINGTEMPS(); // uses temp1 to temp4
int fail = 0;
int gcdfail = 0;
int pb = (size + 1)/2;
pb = 8;
if(qb < 8)
qb = 8;
+
+ // we use ctx->rsa_d for the first result so that we can unlock temps later
for (;;)
{
- CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(temp0, pb));
- if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp0, 10) == 0)
+ LOCKTEMPS();
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(ctx->rsa_d, pb));
+ if(d0_bignum_isprime(ctx->rsa_d, 10) == 0)
+ {
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
continue;
- CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp2, temp0, one));
+ }
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp2, ctx->rsa_d, one));
CHECK(d0_bignum_gcd(temp4, NULL, NULL, temp2, ctx->rsa_e));
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp4, one))
break;
return 0;
++gcdfail;
}
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
+
gcdfail = 0;
for (;;)
{
+ LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_rand_bit_exact(temp1, qb));
- if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp1, temp0))
+ if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp1, ctx->rsa_d))
{
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
if(++fail == 3)
return 0;
+ continue;
}
fail = 0;
- // n = temp0*temp1
- CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(ctx->rsa_n, temp0, temp1));
+ // n = ctx->rsa_d*temp1
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(ctx->rsa_n, ctx->rsa_d, temp1));
if(reject(ctx, pass))
+ {
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
continue;
+ }
if(d0_bignum_isprime(temp1, 10) == 0)
+ {
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
continue;
+ }
CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp3, temp1, one));
CHECK(d0_bignum_gcd(temp4, NULL, NULL, temp3, ctx->rsa_e));
if(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp4, one))
+ {
+ // we do NOT unlock, as we still need temp3
break;
+ }
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
if(++gcdfail == 3)
return 0;
++gcdfail;
}
- // ctx->rsa_d = ctx->rsa_e^-1 mod (temp0-1)(temp1-1)
- CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(temp0, temp2, temp3));
+ // ctx->rsa_d = ctx->rsa_e^-1 mod (ctx->rsa_d-1)(temp1-1)
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_sub(temp2, ctx->rsa_d, one)); // we can't reuse the value from above because temps were unlocked
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_mul(ctx->rsa_d, temp2, temp3));
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_inv(ctx->rsa_d, ctx->rsa_e, temp0));
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
+ UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_longhash_destructive(unsigned char *convbuf, size_t sz, unsigned char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
{
size_t n, i;
+ char shabuf[32];
n = outbuflen;
while(n > SHA_DIGESTSIZE)
{
- memcpy(outbuf, sha(convbuf, sz), SHA_DIGESTSIZE);
+ memcpy(outbuf, sha(shabuf, convbuf, sz), SHA_DIGESTSIZE);
outbuf += SHA_DIGESTSIZE;
n -= SHA_DIGESTSIZE;
for(i = 0; i < sz; ++i)
if(++convbuf[i])
break; // stop until no carry
}
- memcpy(outbuf, sha(convbuf, sz), n);
+ memcpy(outbuf, sha(shabuf, convbuf, sz), n);
return 1;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_longhash_bignum(const d0_bignum_t *in, unsigned char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
{
- static __thread unsigned char convbuf[1024];
+ unsigned char convbuf[1024];
size_t sz;
CHECK(d0_bignum_export_unsigned(in, convbuf, sizeof(convbuf)) >= 0);
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_generate_private_key_fastreject(d0_blind_id_t *ctx, int k, d0_fastreject_function reject, void *pass)
{
- USINGTEMPS();
REPLACING(rsa_e); REPLACING(rsa_d); REPLACING(rsa_n);
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->rsa_e, d0_bignum_int(ctx->rsa_e, 65537));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->rsa_d, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->rsa_d));
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->rsa_n, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->rsa_n));
- LOCKTEMPS();
if(reject)
CHECK(d0_rsa_generate_key_fastreject(k+1, reject, ctx, pass)); // must fit G for sure
else
- CHECK(d0_rsa_generate_key(k+1, ctx->rsa_e, ctx->rsa_d, ctx->rsa_n)); // must fit G for sure
- UNLOCKTEMPS();
+ CHECK(d0_rsa_generate_key(k+1, ctx)); // must fit G for sure
return 1;
fail:
- UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_key(const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen)
{
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char convbuf[2048];
+ unsigned char convbuf[2048];
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz, n;
+ char shabuf[32];
USING(rsa_n); USING(rsa_e);
n = (*outbuflen / 4) * 3;
if(n > SHA_DIGESTSIZE)
n = SHA_DIGESTSIZE;
- CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_raw(out, sha(convbuf, sz), n) == n);
+ CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_raw(out, sha(shabuf, convbuf, sz), n) == n);
CHECK(d0_iobuf_conv_base64_out(out));
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_modulus(d0_blind_id_t *ctx)
{
- USINGTEMPS();
USING(rsa_n);
REPLACING(schnorr_G);
CHECK_ASSIGN(ctx->schnorr_G, d0_bignum_zero(ctx->schnorr_G));
- LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_dl_generate_key(d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n)-1, ctx->schnorr_G));
- UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 1;
fail:
- UNLOCKTEMPS();
return 0;
}
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_generate_private_id_request(d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen)
{
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
+ unsigned char hashbuf[2048];
size_t sz;
USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^challenge, temp1 (4^s)*rsa_blind_signature_camouflage^challenge
LOCKTEMPS();
CHECK(d0_bignum_mov(temp2, ctx->schnorr_g_to_s));
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
- if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
- sz = sizeof(shabuf);
- CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(temp2, shabuf, sz));
- CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, sz));
+ if(sz > sizeof(hashbuf))
+ sz = sizeof(hashbuf);
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(temp2, hashbuf, sz));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, hashbuf, sz));
// hash complete
CHECK(d0_bignum_mod_mul(temp1, temp2, temp0, ctx->rsa_n));
// 1. get random r, send HASH(4^r)
{
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char convbuf[1024];
+ unsigned char convbuf[1024];
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz = 0;
D0_BOOL failed = 0;
+ char shabuf[32];
USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 order, temp0 4^r
if(is_first)
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, ctx->g_to_t));
d0_iobuf_close(conv, &sz);
conv = NULL;
- CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_raw(out, sha(convbuf, sz), SCHNORR_HASHSIZE) == SCHNORR_HASHSIZE);
+ CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_raw(out, sha(shabuf, convbuf, sz), SCHNORR_HASHSIZE) == SCHNORR_HASHSIZE);
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_packet(out, msg, msglen));
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
{
d0_iobuf_t *in = NULL;
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
+ unsigned char hashbuf[2048];
size_t sz;
USINGTEMPS(); // temps: temp0 order, temp0 signature check
// we will actually sign SHA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
CHECK(d0_bignum_mov(temp2, ctx->schnorr_g_to_s));
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
- if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
- sz = sizeof(shabuf);
- CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(temp2, shabuf, sz));
- CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, sz));
+ if(sz > sizeof(hashbuf))
+ sz = sizeof(hashbuf);
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(temp2, hashbuf, sz));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, hashbuf, sz));
// + 7 / 8 is too large, so let's mod it
CHECK(d0_bignum_divmod(NULL, temp1, temp2, ctx->rsa_n));
// (check using H(g^r) which we know)
{
d0_iobuf_t *in = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char convbuf[1024];
+ unsigned char convbuf[1024];
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz;
+ char shabuf[32];
USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 0 y 1 order
USING(challenge); USING(schnorr_G);
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, ctx->other_g_to_t));
d0_iobuf_close(conv, &sz);
conv = NULL;
- if(memcmp(sha(convbuf, sz), ctx->msghash, SCHNORR_HASHSIZE))
+ if(memcmp(sha(shabuf, convbuf, sz), ctx->msghash, SCHNORR_HASHSIZE))
{
// FAIL (not owned by player)
goto fail;
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_generate_missing_signature(d0_blind_id_t *ctx)
{
size_t sz;
- static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
+ unsigned char hashbuf[2048];
USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 2 hash
REPLACING(schnorr_H_g_to_s_signature);
// we will actually sign SHA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
- if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
- sz = sizeof(shabuf);
- CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, shabuf, sz));
+ if(sz > sizeof(hashbuf))
+ sz = sizeof(hashbuf);
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, hashbuf, sz));
LOCKTEMPS();
- CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, sz));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, hashbuf, sz));
// + 7 / 8 is too large, so let's mod it
CHECK(d0_bignum_divmod(NULL, temp1, temp2, ctx->rsa_n));
{
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
unsigned char *convbuf = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
+ unsigned char hashbuf[2048];
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz = 0;
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, temp1));
d0_iobuf_close(conv, &sz);
conv = NULL;
- CHECK(d0_longhash_destructive(convbuf, sz, shabuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp0) + 7) / 8));
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_destructive(convbuf, sz, hashbuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp0) + 7) / 8));
d0_free(convbuf);
convbuf = NULL;
- CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp0) + 7) / 8));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, hashbuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp0) + 7) / 8));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(out, temp2));
// multiply with secret, sub k, modulo order
d0_iobuf_t *in = NULL;
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
unsigned char *convbuf = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char shabuf[2048];
+ unsigned char hashbuf[2048];
size_t sz;
USINGTEMPS(); // temps: 0 sig^e 2 g^s 3 g^-s 4 order
// we will actually sign SHA(4^s) to prevent a malleability attack!
sz = (d0_bignum_size(ctx->rsa_n) + 7) / 8; // this is too long, so we have to take the value % rsa_n when "decrypting"
- if(sz > sizeof(shabuf))
- sz = sizeof(shabuf);
- CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, shabuf, sz));
- CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, shabuf, sz));
+ if(sz > sizeof(hashbuf))
+ sz = sizeof(hashbuf);
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_bignum(ctx->schnorr_g_to_s, hashbuf, sz));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp2, hashbuf, sz));
// + 7 / 8 is too large, so let's mod it
CHECK(d0_bignum_divmod(NULL, temp1, temp2, ctx->rsa_n));
CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_bignum(conv, temp3));
d0_iobuf_close(conv, &sz);
conv = NULL;
- CHECK(d0_longhash_destructive(convbuf, sz, shabuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp4) + 7) / 8));
+ CHECK(d0_longhash_destructive(convbuf, sz, hashbuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp4) + 7) / 8));
d0_free(convbuf);
convbuf = NULL;
- CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp1, shabuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp4) + 7) / 8));
+ CHECK(d0_bignum_import_unsigned(temp1, hashbuf, (d0_bignum_size(temp4) + 7) / 8));
// verify signature
CHECK(!d0_bignum_cmp(temp0, temp1));
D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT D0_BOOL d0_blind_id_fingerprint64_public_id(const d0_blind_id_t *ctx, char *outbuf, size_t *outbuflen)
{
d0_iobuf_t *out = NULL;
- static __thread unsigned char convbuf[1024];
+ unsigned char convbuf[1024];
d0_iobuf_t *conv = NULL;
size_t sz, n;
+ char shabuf[32];
USING(rsa_n);
USING(rsa_e);
n = (*outbuflen / 4) * 3;
if(n > SHA_DIGESTSIZE)
n = SHA_DIGESTSIZE;
- CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_raw(out, sha(convbuf, sz), n) == n);
+ CHECK(d0_iobuf_write_raw(out, sha(shabuf, convbuf, sz), n) == n);
CHECK(d0_iobuf_conv_base64_out(out));
return d0_iobuf_close(out, outbuflen);
SHA256_Update(&context, (const unsigned char *) in, n);
return SHA256_Final((unsigned char *) out, &context);
}
+
+void d0_blind_id_setmallocfuncs(d0_malloc_t *m, d0_free_t *f)
+{
+ d0_setmallocfuncs(m, f);
+}
+void d0_blind_id_setmutexfuncs(d0_createmutex_t *c, d0_destroymutex_t *d, d0_lockmutex_t *l, d0_unlockmutex_t *u)
+{
+ d0_setmutexfuncs(c, d, l, u);
+}
projects / xonotic / d0_blind_id.git / blobdiff