static cvar_t rcon_restricted_commands = {0, "rcon_restricted_commands", "", "allowed commands for rcon when the restricted mode password was used"};
static cvar_t rcon_secure_maxdiff = {0, "rcon_secure_maxdiff", "5", "maximum time difference between rcon request and server system clock (to protect against replay attack)"};
extern cvar_t rcon_secure;
+extern cvar_t rcon_secure_challengetimeout;
/* statistic counters */
static int packetsSent = 0;
static int hostport = -1;
void NetConn_UpdateSockets(void)
{
+ int i, j;
+
if (cls.state != ca_dedicated)
{
if (clientport2 != cl_netport.integer)
if (sv.active)
Con_Print("Changing \"port\" will not take effect until \"map\" command is executed.\n");
}
+
+ for (j = 0;j < MAX_RCONS;j++)
+ {
+ i = (cls.rcon_ringpos + j + 1) % MAX_RCONS;
+ if(cls.rcon_commands[i][0])
+ {
+ if(realtime > cls.rcon_timeout[i])
+ {
+ char s[128];
+ LHNETADDRESS_ToString(&cls.rcon_addresses[i], s, sizeof(s), true);
+ Con_Printf("rcon to %s (for command %s) failed: challenge request timed out\n", s, cls.rcon_commands[i]);
+ cls.rcon_commands[i][0] = 0;
+ --cls.rcon_trying;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
static int NetConn_ReceivedMessage(netconn_t *conn, unsigned char *data, int length, protocolversion_t protocol, double newtimeout)
Com_HexDumpToConsole(data, length);
}
+ if (length > 10 && !memcmp(string, "challenge ", 10) && cls.rcon_trying)
+ {
+ int i, j;
+ for (j = 0;j < MAX_RCONS;j++)
+ {
+ i = (cls.rcon_ringpos + j) % MAX_RCONS;
+ if(cls.rcon_commands[i][0])
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.rcon_addresses[i]))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j < MAX_RCONS)
+ {
+ char buf[1500];
+ char argbuf[1500];
+ dpsnprintf(argbuf, sizeof(argbuf), "%s %s", string + 10, cls.rcon_commands[i]);
+ memcpy(buf, "\377\377\377\377srcon HMAC-MD4 CHALLENGE ", 29);
+ if(HMAC_MDFOUR_16BYTES((unsigned char *) (buf + 29), (unsigned char *) argbuf, strlen(argbuf), (unsigned char *) rcon_password.string, strlen(rcon_password.string)))
+ {
+ buf[45] = ' ';
+ strlcpy(buf + 46, argbuf, sizeof(buf) - 46);
+ NetConn_Write(mysocket, buf, 46 + strlen(buf + 46), peeraddress);
+ cls.rcon_commands[i][0] = 0;
+ --cls.rcon_trying;
+
+ for (i = 0;i < MAX_RCONS;i++)
+ if(cls.rcon_commands[i][0])
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.rcon_addresses[i]))
+ break;
+ if(i < MAX_RCONS)
+ {
+ NetConn_WriteString(mysocket, "\377\377\377\377getchallenge", peeraddress);
+ // extend the timeout on other requests as we asked for a challenge
+ for (i = 0;i < MAX_RCONS;i++)
+ if(cls.rcon_commands[i][0])
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.rcon_addresses[i]))
+ cls.rcon_timeout[i] = realtime + rcon_secure_challengetimeout.value;
+ }
+
+ return true; // we used up the challenge, so we can't use this oen for connecting now anyway
+ }
+ }
+ }
if (length > 10 && !memcmp(string, "challenge ", 10) && cls.connect_trying)
{
// darkplaces or quake3
}
}
-typedef qboolean (*rcon_matchfunc_t) (const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen);
+typedef qboolean (*rcon_matchfunc_t) (lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen);
-qboolean hmac_mdfour_matching(const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
+qboolean hmac_mdfour_time_matching(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
{
char mdfourbuf[16];
long t1, t2;
return !memcmp(mdfourbuf, hash, 16);
}
-qboolean plaintext_matching(const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
+qboolean hmac_mdfour_challenge_matching(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
+{
+ char mdfourbuf[16];
+ int i;
+
+ if(slen < (int)(sizeof(challenge[0].string)) - 1)
+ return false;
+
+ // validate the challenge
+ for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
+ if(challenge[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strncmp(challenge[i].string, s, sizeof(challenge[0].string) - 1))
+ break;
+ // if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
+ if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
+ return false;
+
+ if(!HMAC_MDFOUR_16BYTES((unsigned char *) mdfourbuf, (unsigned char *) s, slen, (unsigned char *) password, strlen(password)))
+ return false;
+
+ if(memcmp(mdfourbuf, hash, 16))
+ return false;
+
+ // unmark challenge to prevent replay attacks
+ challenge[i].time = 0;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+qboolean plaintext_matching(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
{
return !strcmp(password, hash);
}
/// returns a string describing the user level, or NULL for auth failure
-const char *RCon_Authenticate(const char *password, const char *s, const char *endpos, rcon_matchfunc_t comparator, const char *cs, int cslen)
+const char *RCon_Authenticate(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *s, const char *endpos, rcon_matchfunc_t comparator, const char *cs, int cslen)
{
const char *text;
qboolean hasquotes;
- if(comparator(rcon_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
+ if(comparator(peeraddress, rcon_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
return "rcon";
- if(!comparator(rcon_restricted_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
+ if(!comparator(peeraddress, rcon_restricted_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
return NULL;
for(text = s; text != endpos; ++text)
{
for (i = 0, best = 0, besttime = realtime;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
{
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address))
- break;
+ if(challenge[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address))
+ break;
if (besttime > challenge[i].time)
besttime = challenge[best = i].time;
}
return true;
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
- break;
+ if(challenge[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
+ break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
return true;
char *s = strchr(timeval, ' ');
char *endpos = string + length + 1; // one behind the NUL, so adding strlen+1 will eventually reach it
const char *userlevel;
+
+ if(rcon_secure.integer > 1)
+ return true;
+
+ if(!s)
+ return true; // invalid packet
+ ++s;
+
+ userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(peeraddress, password, s, endpos, hmac_mdfour_time_matching, timeval, endpos - timeval - 1); // not including the appended \0 into the HMAC
+ RCon_Execute(mysocket, peeraddress, addressstring2, userlevel, s, endpos);
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (length >= 42 && !memcmp(string, "srcon HMAC-MD4 CHALLENGE ", 25))
+ {
+ char *password = string + 25;
+ char *challenge = string + 42;
+ char *s = strchr(challenge, ' ');
+ char *endpos = string + length + 1; // one behind the NUL, so adding strlen+1 will eventually reach it
+ const char *userlevel;
if(!s)
return true; // invalid packet
++s;
- userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(password, s, endpos, hmac_mdfour_matching, timeval, endpos - timeval - 1); // not including the appended \0 into the HMAC
+ userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(peeraddress, password, s, endpos, hmac_mdfour_challenge_matching, challenge, endpos - challenge - 1); // not including the appended \0 into the HMAC
RCon_Execute(mysocket, peeraddress, addressstring2, userlevel, s, endpos);
return true;
}
password[i] = 0;
if (!ISWHITESPACE(password[0]))
{
- const char *userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(password, s, endpos, plaintext_matching, NULL, 0);
+ const char *userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(peeraddress, password, s, endpos, plaintext_matching, NULL, 0);
RCon_Execute(mysocket, peeraddress, addressstring2, userlevel, s, endpos);
}
return true;
projects / xonotic / darkplaces.git / blobdiff