static cvar_t gameversion = {0, "gameversion", "0", "version of game data (mod-specific) to be sent to querying clients"};
static cvar_t gameversion_min = {0, "gameversion_min", "-1", "minimum version of game data (mod-specific), when client and server gameversion mismatch in the server browser the server is shown as incompatible; if -1, gameversion is used alone"};
static cvar_t gameversion_max = {0, "gameversion_max", "-1", "maximum version of game data (mod-specific), when client and server gameversion mismatch in the server browser the server is shown as incompatible; if -1, gameversion is used alone"};
-static cvar_t rcon_restricted_password = {CVAR_PRIVATE, "rcon_restricted_password", "", "password to authenticate rcon commands in restricted mode"};
+static cvar_t rcon_restricted_password = {CVAR_PRIVATE, "rcon_restricted_password", "", "password to authenticate rcon commands in restricted mode; may be set to a string of the form user1:pass1 user2:pass2 user3:pass3 to allow multiple user accounts - the client then has to specify ONE of these combinations"};
static cvar_t rcon_restricted_commands = {0, "rcon_restricted_commands", "", "allowed commands for rcon when the restricted mode password was used"};
static cvar_t rcon_secure_maxdiff = {0, "rcon_secure_maxdiff", "5", "maximum time difference between rcon request and server system clock (to protect against replay attack)"};
extern cvar_t rcon_secure;
int net_extresponse_count = 0;
int net_extresponse_last = 0;
+char sv_net_extresponse[NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX][1400];
+int sv_net_extresponse_count = 0;
+int sv_net_extresponse_last = 0;
+
// ServerList interface
serverlist_mask_t serverlist_andmasks[SERVERLIST_ANDMASKCOUNT];
serverlist_mask_t serverlist_ormasks[SERVERLIST_ORMASKCOUNT];
int i, j;
for (j = 0;j < MAX_RCONS;j++)
{
- i = (cls.rcon_ringpos + j + 1) % MAX_RCONS;
+ i = (cls.rcon_ringpos + j) % MAX_RCONS;
if(cls.rcon_commands[i][0])
if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.rcon_addresses[i]))
break;
{
char buf[1500];
char argbuf[1500];
+ const char *e;
+ int n;
dpsnprintf(argbuf, sizeof(argbuf), "%s %s", string + 10, cls.rcon_commands[i]);
memcpy(buf, "\377\377\377\377srcon HMAC-MD4 CHALLENGE ", 29);
- if(HMAC_MDFOUR_16BYTES((unsigned char *) (buf + 29), (unsigned char *) argbuf, strlen(argbuf), (unsigned char *) rcon_password.string, strlen(rcon_password.string)))
+
+ e = strchr(rcon_password.string, ' ');
+ n = e ? e-rcon_password.string : (int)strlen(rcon_password.string);
+
+ if(HMAC_MDFOUR_16BYTES((unsigned char *) (buf + 29), (unsigned char *) argbuf, strlen(argbuf), (unsigned char *) rcon_password.string, n))
{
buf[45] = ' ';
strlcpy(buf + 46, argbuf, sizeof(buf) - 46);
if(net_extresponse_count > NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX)
net_extresponse_count = NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX;
net_extresponse_last = (net_extresponse_last + 1) % NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX;
- dpsnprintf(net_extresponse[net_extresponse_last], sizeof(net_extresponse[net_extresponse_last]), "'%s' %s", addressstring2, string + 12);
+ dpsnprintf(net_extresponse[net_extresponse_last], sizeof(net_extresponse[net_extresponse_last]), "\"%s\" %s", addressstring2, string + 12);
return true;
}
if (!strncmp(string, "ping", 4))
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strncmp(challenge[i].string, s, sizeof(challenge[0].string) - 1))
- break;
+ if(challenge[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strncmp(challenge[i].string, s, sizeof(challenge[0].string) - 1))
+ break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
return false;
return false;
// unmark challenge to prevent replay attacks
- // FIXME as there is currently no unmark facility, let's invalidate it
- // as much as possible
- challenge[i].string[0] = '\\'; // not allowed in infostrings, so connects cannot match
- NetConn_BuildChallengeString(challenge[i].string + 1, sizeof(challenge[i].string) - 1);
challenge[i].time = 0;
- LHNETADDRESS_FromString(&challenge[i].address, "local:42", 42); // no rcon will come from there for sure
- challenge[i].address = *peeraddress;
return true;
}
/// returns a string describing the user level, or NULL for auth failure
const char *RCon_Authenticate(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *s, const char *endpos, rcon_matchfunc_t comparator, const char *cs, int cslen)
{
- const char *text;
+ const char *text, *userpass_start, *userpass_end, *userpass_startpass;
+ char buf[MAX_INPUTLINE];
qboolean hasquotes;
+ qboolean restricted = false;
+ qboolean have_usernames = false;
+
+ userpass_start = rcon_password.string;
+ while((userpass_end = strchr(userpass_start, ' ')))
+ {
+ have_usernames = true;
+ strlcpy(buf, userpass_start, ((size_t)(userpass_end-userpass_start) >= sizeof(buf)) ? (int)(sizeof(buf)) : (int)(userpass_end-userpass_start+1));
+ if(buf[0])
+ if(comparator(peeraddress, buf, password, cs, cslen))
+ goto allow;
+ userpass_start = userpass_end + 1;
+ }
+ if(userpass_start[0])
+ {
+ userpass_end = userpass_start + strlen(userpass_start);
+ if(comparator(peeraddress, userpass_start, password, cs, cslen))
+ goto allow;
+ }
- if(comparator(peeraddress, rcon_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
- return "rcon";
+ restricted = true;
+ have_usernames = false;
+ userpass_start = rcon_restricted_password.string;
+ while((userpass_end = strchr(userpass_start, ' ')))
+ {
+ have_usernames = true;
+ strlcpy(buf, userpass_start, ((size_t)(userpass_end-userpass_start) >= sizeof(buf)) ? (int)(sizeof(buf)) : (int)(userpass_end-userpass_start+1));
+ if(buf[0])
+ if(comparator(peeraddress, buf, password, cs, cslen))
+ goto check;
+ userpass_start = userpass_end + 1;
+ }
+ if(userpass_start[0])
+ {
+ userpass_end = userpass_start + strlen(userpass_start);
+ if(comparator(peeraddress, userpass_start, password, cs, cslen))
+ goto check;
+ }
- if(!comparator(peeraddress, rcon_restricted_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
- return NULL;
+ return NULL; // DENIED
+check:
for(text = s; text != endpos; ++text)
if((signed char) *text > 0 && ((signed char) *text < (signed char) ' ' || *text == ';'))
return NULL; // block possible exploits against the parser/alias expansion
s += l + 1;
}
+allow:
+ userpass_startpass = strchr(userpass_start, ':');
+ if(have_usernames && userpass_startpass && userpass_startpass < userpass_end)
+ return va("%srcon (username %.*s)", restricted ? "restricted " : "", (int)(userpass_startpass-userpass_start), userpass_start);
+ else
+ return va("%srcon", restricted ? "restricted " : "");
+
return "restricted rcon";
}
{
for (i = 0, best = 0, besttime = realtime;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
{
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address))
- break;
+ if(challenge[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address))
+ break;
if (besttime > challenge[i].time)
besttime = challenge[best = i].time;
}
return true;
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
- break;
+ if(challenge[i].time > 0)
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strcmp(challenge[i].string, s))
+ break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
return true;
char *endpos = string + length + 1; // one behind the NUL, so adding strlen+1 will eventually reach it
char password[64];
- if(rcon_secure.integer)
+ if(rcon_secure.integer > 0)
return true;
for (i = 0;!ISWHITESPACE(*s);s++)
}
return true;
}
+ if (!strncmp(string, "extResponse ", 12))
+ {
+ ++sv_net_extresponse_count;
+ if(sv_net_extresponse_count > NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX)
+ sv_net_extresponse_count = NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX;
+ sv_net_extresponse_last = (net_extresponse_last + 1) % NET_EXTRESPONSE_MAX;
+ dpsnprintf(sv_net_extresponse[sv_net_extresponse_last], sizeof(sv_net_extresponse[net_extresponse_last]), "'%s' %s", addressstring2, string + 12);
+ return true;
+ }
if (!strncmp(string, "ping", 4))
{
if (developer.integer >= 10)
projects / xonotic / darkplaces.git / blobdiff