]> de.git.xonotic.org Git - xonotic/darkplaces.git/commitdiff
rcon_secure: alternative getchallenge-based authentication that doesn't rely on the...
authordivverent <divverent@d7cf8633-e32d-0410-b094-e92efae38249>
Fri, 2 Oct 2009 08:19:58 +0000 (08:19 +0000)
committerdivverent <divverent@d7cf8633-e32d-0410-b094-e92efae38249>
Fri, 2 Oct 2009 08:19:58 +0000 (08:19 +0000)
git-svn-id: svn://svn.icculus.org/twilight/trunk/darkplaces@9278 d7cf8633-e32d-0410-b094-e92efae38249

netconn.c

index ea6e92c0b90595eafbc5216d044029a24f7bebb9..80355210aa5eeb8eb499be71f2390ccad9363fa9 100755 (executable)
--- a/netconn.c
+++ b/netconn.c
@@ -2292,9 +2292,9 @@ void NetConn_ClearConnectFlood(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
        }
 }
 
-typedef qboolean (*rcon_matchfunc_t) (const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen);
+typedef qboolean (*rcon_matchfunc_t) (lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen);
 
-qboolean hmac_mdfour_matching(const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
+qboolean hmac_mdfour_time_matching(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
 {
        char mdfourbuf[16];
        long t1, t2;
@@ -2310,21 +2310,55 @@ qboolean hmac_mdfour_matching(const char *password, const char *hash, const char
        return !memcmp(mdfourbuf, hash, 16);
 }
 
-qboolean plaintext_matching(const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
+qboolean hmac_mdfour_challenge_matching(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
+{
+       char mdfourbuf[16];
+       int i;
+
+       if(slen < (int)(sizeof(challenge[0].string)) - 1)
+               return false;
+
+       // validate the challenge
+       for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
+               if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenge[i].address) && !strncmp(challenge[i].string, s, sizeof(challenge[0].string) - 1))
+                       break;
+       // if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
+       if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
+               return false;
+
+       if(!HMAC_MDFOUR_16BYTES((unsigned char *) mdfourbuf, (unsigned char *) s, slen, (unsigned char *) password, strlen(password)))
+               return false;
+
+       if(memcmp(mdfourbuf, hash, 16))
+               return false;
+
+       // unmark challenge to prevent replay attacks
+       // FIXME as there is currently no unmark facility, let's invalidate it
+       // as much as possible
+       challenge[i].string[0] = '\\'; // not allowed in infostrings, so connects cannot match
+       NetConn_BuildChallengeString(challenge[i].string + 1, sizeof(challenge[i].string) - 1);
+       challenge[i].time = 0;
+       LHNETADDRESS_FromString(&challenge[i].address, "local:42", 42); // no rcon will come from there for sure
+       challenge[i].address = *peeraddress;
+
+       return true;
+}
+
+qboolean plaintext_matching(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *hash, const char *s, int slen)
 {
        return !strcmp(password, hash);
 }
 
 /// returns a string describing the user level, or NULL for auth failure
-const char *RCon_Authenticate(const char *password, const char *s, const char *endpos, rcon_matchfunc_t comparator, const char *cs, int cslen)
+const char *RCon_Authenticate(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *password, const char *s, const char *endpos, rcon_matchfunc_t comparator, const char *cs, int cslen)
 {
        const char *text;
        qboolean hasquotes;
 
-       if(comparator(rcon_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
+       if(comparator(peeraddress, rcon_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
                return "rcon";
        
-       if(!comparator(rcon_restricted_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
+       if(!comparator(peeraddress, rcon_restricted_password.string, password, cs, cslen))
                return NULL;
 
        for(text = s; text != endpos; ++text)
@@ -2595,11 +2629,30 @@ static int NetConn_ServerParsePacket(lhnetsocket_t *mysocket, unsigned char *dat
                        char *s = strchr(timeval, ' ');
                        char *endpos = string + length + 1; // one behind the NUL, so adding strlen+1 will eventually reach it
                        const char *userlevel;
+
+                       if(rcon_secure.integer > 1)
+                               return true;
+
+                       if(!s)
+                               return true; // invalid packet
+                       ++s;
+
+                       userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(peeraddress, password, s, endpos, hmac_mdfour_time_matching, timeval, endpos - timeval - 1); // not including the appended \0 into the HMAC
+                       RCon_Execute(mysocket, peeraddress, addressstring2, userlevel, s, endpos);
+                       return true;
+               }
+               if (length >= 42 && !memcmp(string, "srcon HMAC-MD4 CHALLENGE ", 25))
+               {
+                       char *password = string + 25;
+                       char *challenge = string + 42;
+                       char *s = strchr(challenge, ' ');
+                       char *endpos = string + length + 1; // one behind the NUL, so adding strlen+1 will eventually reach it
+                       const char *userlevel;
                        if(!s)
                                return true; // invalid packet
                        ++s;
 
-                       userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(password, s, endpos, hmac_mdfour_matching, timeval, endpos - timeval - 1); // not including the appended \0 into the HMAC
+                       userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(peeraddress, password, s, endpos, hmac_mdfour_challenge_matching, challenge, endpos - challenge - 1); // not including the appended \0 into the HMAC
                        RCon_Execute(mysocket, peeraddress, addressstring2, userlevel, s, endpos);
                        return true;
                }
@@ -2621,7 +2674,7 @@ static int NetConn_ServerParsePacket(lhnetsocket_t *mysocket, unsigned char *dat
                        password[i] = 0;
                        if (!ISWHITESPACE(password[0]))
                        {
-                               const char *userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(password, s, endpos, plaintext_matching, NULL, 0);
+                               const char *userlevel = RCon_Authenticate(peeraddress, password, s, endpos, plaintext_matching, NULL, 0);
                                RCon_Execute(mysocket, peeraddress, addressstring2, userlevel, s, endpos);
                        }
                        return true;