+/*
+Copyright (C) 2010-2015 Rudolf Polzer (divVerent)
+Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Ashley Rose Hale (LadyHavoc)
+
+This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+
+*/
+
#include "quakedef.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "hmac.h"
#include "libcurl.h"
-cvar_t crypto_developer = {CVAR_CLIENT | CVAR_SERVER | CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_developer", "0", "print extra info about crypto handshake"};
-cvar_t crypto_aeslevel = {CVAR_CLIENT | CVAR_SERVER | CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_aeslevel", "1", "whether to support AES encryption in authenticated connections (0 = no, 1 = supported, 2 = requested, 3 = required)"};
+cvar_t crypto_developer = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_developer", "0", "print extra info about crypto handshake"};
+cvar_t crypto_aeslevel = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_aeslevel", "1", "whether to support AES encryption in authenticated connections (0 = no, 1 = supported, 2 = requested, 3 = required)"};
-cvar_t crypto_servercpupercent = {CVAR_CLIENT | CVAR_SERVER | CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpupercent", "10", "allowed crypto CPU load in percent for server operation (0 = no limit, faster)"};
-cvar_t crypto_servercpumaxtime = {CVAR_CLIENT | CVAR_SERVER | CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpumaxtime", "0.01", "maximum allowed crypto CPU time per frame (0 = no limit)"};
-cvar_t crypto_servercpudebug = {CVAR_CLIENT | CVAR_SERVER | CVAR_SAVE, "crypto_servercpudebug", "0", "print statistics about time usage by crypto"};
+cvar_t crypto_servercpupercent = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_servercpupercent", "10", "allowed crypto CPU load in percent for server operation (0 = no limit, faster)"};
+cvar_t crypto_servercpumaxtime = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_servercpumaxtime", "0.01", "maximum allowed crypto CPU time per frame (0 = no limit)"};
+cvar_t crypto_servercpudebug = {CF_CLIENT | CF_SERVER | CF_ARCHIVE, "crypto_servercpudebug", "0", "print statistics about time usage by crypto"};
static double crypto_servercpu_accumulator = 0;
static double crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = 0;
// d0_blind_id interface
#define D0_EXPORT
-#ifdef __GNUC__
+#if defined (__GNUC__) || (__clang__) || (__TINYC__)
#define D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__((warn_unused_result))
#else
#define D0_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
// end of d0_blind_id interface
static dllhandle_t d0_blind_id_dll = NULL;
-static qboolean Crypto_OpenLibrary (void)
+static qbool Crypto_OpenLibrary (void)
{
const char* dllnames [] =
{
return true;
// Load the DLL
- return Sys_LoadLibrary (dllnames, &d0_blind_id_dll, d0_blind_id_funcs);
+ return Sys_LoadDependency (dllnames, &d0_blind_id_dll, d0_blind_id_funcs);
}
static void Crypto_CloseLibrary (void)
{
- Sys_UnloadLibrary (&d0_blind_id_dll);
+ Sys_FreeLibrary (&d0_blind_id_dll);
}
#endif
// end of d0_blind_id interface
static dllhandle_t d0_rijndael_dll = NULL;
-static qboolean Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary (void)
+static qbool Crypto_Rijndael_OpenLibrary (void)
{
const char* dllnames [] =
{
return true;
// Load the DLL
- return Sys_LoadLibrary (dllnames, &d0_rijndael_dll, d0_rijndael_funcs);
+ return Sys_LoadDependency (dllnames, &d0_rijndael_dll, d0_rijndael_funcs);
}
static void Crypto_Rijndael_CloseLibrary (void)
{
- Sys_UnloadLibrary (&d0_rijndael_dll);
+ Sys_FreeLibrary (&d0_rijndael_dll);
}
#endif
qd0_blind_id_util_sha256((char *) out, (const char *) in, n);
}
-static size_t Crypto_LoadFile(const char *path, char *buf, size_t nmax, qboolean inuserdir)
+static size_t Crypto_LoadFile(const char *path, char *buf, size_t nmax, qbool inuserdir)
{
char vabuf[1024];
qfile_t *f = NULL;
return (size_t) n;
}
-static qboolean PutWithNul(char **data, size_t *len, const char *str)
+static qbool PutWithNul(char **data, size_t *len, const char *str)
{
// invariant: data points to insertion point
size_t l = strlen(str);
}
// d0si reading
-static qboolean Crypto_AddPrivateKey(d0_blind_id_t *pk, char *buf, size_t len)
+static qbool Crypto_AddPrivateKey(d0_blind_id_t *pk, char *buf, size_t len)
{
const char *p[1];
size_t l[1];
#define MAX_PUBKEYS 16
static d0_blind_id_t *pubkeys[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static char pubkeys_fp64[MAX_PUBKEYS][FP64_SIZE+1];
-static qboolean pubkeys_havepriv[MAX_PUBKEYS];
-static qboolean pubkeys_havesig[MAX_PUBKEYS];
+static qbool pubkeys_havepriv[MAX_PUBKEYS];
+static qbool pubkeys_havesig[MAX_PUBKEYS];
static char pubkeys_priv_fp64[MAX_PUBKEYS][FP64_SIZE+1];
static char challenge_append[1400];
static size_t challenge_append_length;
int next_step;
char challenge[2048];
char wantserver_idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
- qboolean wantserver_aes;
- qboolean wantserver_issigned;
+ qbool wantserver_aes;
+ qbool wantserver_issigned;
int cdata_id;
}
crypto_data_t;
#define MAKE_CDATA if(!crypto->data) crypto->data = Z_Malloc(sizeof(crypto_data_t))
#define CLEAR_CDATA if(crypto->data) { if(CDATA->id) qd0_blind_id_free(CDATA->id); Z_Free(crypto->data); } crypto->data = NULL
-static crypto_t *Crypto_ServerFindInstance(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, qboolean allow_create)
+static crypto_t *Crypto_ServerFindInstance(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, qbool allow_create)
{
crypto_t *crypto;
int i, best;
if(i < MAX_CRYPTOCONNECTS && (allow_create || cryptoconnects[i].crypto.data))
{
crypto = &cryptoconnects[i].crypto;
- cryptoconnects[i].lasttime = realtime;
+ cryptoconnects[i].lasttime = host.realtime;
return crypto;
}
if(!allow_create)
if(cryptoconnects[i].lasttime < cryptoconnects[best].lasttime)
best = i;
crypto = &cryptoconnects[best].crypto;
- cryptoconnects[best].lasttime = realtime;
+ cryptoconnects[best].lasttime = host.realtime;
memcpy(&cryptoconnects[best].address, peeraddress, sizeof(cryptoconnects[best].address));
CLEAR_CDATA;
return crypto;
}
-qboolean Crypto_FinishInstance(crypto_t *out, crypto_t *crypto)
+qbool Crypto_FinishInstance(crypto_t *out, crypto_t *crypto)
{
// no check needed here (returned pointers are only used in prefilled fields)
if(!crypto || !crypto->authenticated)
int keyid;
char idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int aeslevel;
- qboolean issigned;
+ qbool issigned;
}
crypto_storedhostkey_t;
static crypto_storedhostkey_t *crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE];
}
}
-static qboolean Crypto_ClearHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
+static qbool Crypto_ClearHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
crypto_storedhostkey_t **hkp;
- qboolean found = false;
+ qbool found = false;
LHNETADDRESS_ToString(peeraddress, buf, sizeof(buf), 1);
hashindex = CRC_Block((const unsigned char *) buf, strlen(buf)) % CRYPTO_HOSTKEY_HASHSIZE;
return found;
}
-static void Crypto_StoreHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *keystring, qboolean complain)
+static void Crypto_StoreHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *keystring, qbool complain)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
int keyid;
char idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int aeslevel;
- qboolean issigned;
+ qbool issigned;
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return;
{
// id@key
const char *idstart, *idend, *keystart, *keyend;
- qboolean thisissigned = true;
+ qbool thisissigned = true;
++keystring; // skip the space
idstart = keystring;
while(*keystring && *keystring != ' ' && *keystring != '@')
crypto_storedhostkey_hashtable[hashindex] = hk;
}
-qboolean Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, int *keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, int *aeslevel, qboolean *issigned)
+qbool Crypto_RetrieveHostKey(lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, int *keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, int *aeslevel, qbool *issigned)
{
char buf[128];
int hashindex;
if(keyid)
*keyid = hk->keyid;
if(keyfp)
- strlcpy(keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[hk->keyid], keyfplen);
+ dp_strlcpy(keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[hk->keyid], keyfplen);
if(idfp)
- strlcpy(idfp, hk->idfp, idfplen);
+ dp_strlcpy(idfp, hk->idfp, idfplen);
if(aeslevel)
*aeslevel = hk->aeslevel;
if(issigned)
return true;
}
-int Crypto_RetrieveLocalKey(int keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, qboolean *issigned) // return value: -1 if more to come, +1 if valid, 0 if end of list
+int Crypto_RetrieveLocalKey(int keyid, char *keyfp, size_t keyfplen, char *idfp, size_t idfplen, qbool *issigned) // return value: -1 if more to come, +1 if valid, 0 if end of list
{
if(keyid < 0 || keyid >= MAX_PUBKEYS)
return 0;
if(!pubkeys[keyid])
return -1;
if(keyfp)
- strlcpy(keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[keyid], keyfplen);
+ dp_strlcpy(keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[keyid], keyfplen);
if(idfp)
if(pubkeys_havepriv[keyid])
- strlcpy(idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[keyid], idfplen);
+ dp_strlcpy(idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[keyid], idfplen);
if(issigned)
*issigned = pubkeys_havesig[keyid];
return 1;
challenge_append_length = p - challenge_append;
}
-static qboolean Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(int i)
+static qbool Crypto_SavePubKeyTextFile(int i)
{
qfile_t *f;
char vabuf[1024];
dpsnprintf(crypto_idstring_buf, sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf), "%d", d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PUBKEYS; ++i)
if (pubkeys[i])
- strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], pubkeys_havesig[i] ? "" : "~", pubkeys_fp64[i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
+ dp_strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[i], pubkeys_havesig[i] ? "" : "~", pubkeys_fp64[i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
crypto_idstring = crypto_idstring_buf;
}
}
// end
-qboolean Crypto_Available(void)
+qbool Crypto_Available(void)
{
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
return false;
{
if(length_received >= 5 && Crypto_LittleLong((const char *) buffer) == FOURCC_D0ER)
{
- Con_Printf("Error response from keygen server: %.*s\n", (int)(length_received - 5), buffer + 5);
+ Con_Printf(CON_ERROR "Error response from keygen server: %.*s\n", (int)(length_received - 5), buffer + 5);
}
else
{
- Con_Printf("Invalid response from keygen server:\n");
+ Con_Printf(CON_ERROR "Invalid response from keygen server:\n");
Com_HexDumpToConsole(buffer, (int)length_received);
}
keygen_i = -1;
{
Con_Printf("Generated private ID key_%d.d0pk (public key fingerprint: %s)\n", keygen_i, pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i]);
pubkeys_havepriv[keygen_i] = true;
- strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i], pubkeys_fp64[keygen_i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
+ dp_strlcat(crypto_idstring_buf, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), " %s@%s", pubkeys_priv_fp64[keygen_i], pubkeys_fp64[keygen_i]), sizeof(crypto_idstring_buf));
crypto_idstring = crypto_idstring_buf;
Crypto_BuildChallengeAppend();
}
{
if(d0_blind_id_dll)
{
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_client, "crypto_reload", Crypto_Reload_f, "reloads cryptographic keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_client, "crypto_keygen", Crypto_KeyGen_f, "generates and saves a cryptographic key");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_client, "crypto_keys", Crypto_Keys_f, "lists the loaded keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_client, "crypto_hostkeys", Crypto_HostKeys_f, "lists the cached host keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_client, "crypto_hostkey_clear", Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f, "clears a cached host key");
-
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_server, "crypto_reload", Crypto_Reload_f, "reloads cryptographic keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_server, "crypto_keygen", Crypto_KeyGen_f, "generates and saves a cryptographic key");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_server, "crypto_keys", Crypto_Keys_f, "lists the loaded keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_server, "crypto_hostkeys", Crypto_HostKeys_f, "lists the cached host keys");
- Cmd_AddCommand(&cmd_server, "crypto_hostkey_clear", Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f, "clears a cached host key");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_reload", Crypto_Reload_f, "reloads cryptographic keys");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_keygen", Crypto_KeyGen_f, "generates and saves a cryptographic key");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_keys", Crypto_Keys_f, "lists the loaded keys");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_hostkeys", Crypto_HostKeys_f, "lists the cached host keys");
+ Cmd_AddCommand(CF_SHARED, "crypto_hostkey_clear", Crypto_HostKey_Clear_f, "clears a cached host key");
Cvar_RegisterVariable(&crypto_developer);
if(d0_rijndael_dll)
}
// network protocol
-qboolean Crypto_ServerAppendToChallenge(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, size_t maxlen_out)
+qbool Crypto_ServerAppendToChallenge(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, size_t maxlen_out)
{
// cheap op, all is precomputed
if(!d0_blind_id_dll)
if (len_in > 8 && !memcmp(string, "connect\\", 8) && d0_rijndael_dll && crypto_aeslevel.integer >= 3)
{
- const char *s;
int i;
// sorry, we have to verify the challenge here to not reflect network spam
- if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
+ if (!InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH; // will be later accepted if encryption was set up
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
if(challenges[i].time > 0)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenges[i].address) && !strcmp(challenges[i].string, s))
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenges[i].address) && !strcmp(challenges[i].string, infostringvalue))
break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES) // challenge mismatch is silent
}
else if(len_in > 5 && !memcmp(string, "d0pk\\", 5) && ((LHNETADDRESS_GetAddressType(peeraddress) == LHNETADDRESSTYPE_LOOP) || sv_public.integer > -3))
{
- const char *cnt, *s, *p;
+ const char *cnt, *p;
int id;
int clientid = -1, serverid = -1;
- cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
- id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);
- cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
+ id = (InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)) ? atoi(infostringvalue) : -1);
+ cnt = (InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)) ? infostringvalue : NULL);
if(!cnt)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "missing cnt in d0pk");
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(!strcmp(cnt, "0"))
{
int i;
- if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
+ if (!InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "challenge", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "missing challenge in d0pk\\0");
// validate the challenge
for (i = 0;i < MAX_CHALLENGES;i++)
if(challenges[i].time > 0)
- if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenges[i].address) && !strcmp(challenges[i].string, s))
+ if (!LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &challenges[i].address) && !strcmp(challenges[i].string, infostringvalue))
break;
// if the challenge is not recognized, drop the packet
if (i == MAX_CHALLENGES)
return Crypto_SoftServerError(data_out, len_out, "invalid challenge in d0pk\\0");
- if (!(s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aeslevel", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
+ if (!InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aeslevel", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
aeslevel = 0; // not supported
else
- aeslevel = bound(0, atoi(s), 3);
+ aeslevel = bound(0, atoi(infostringvalue), 3);
switch(bound(0, d0_rijndael_dll ? crypto_aeslevel.integer : 0, 3))
{
default: // dummy, never happens, but to make gcc happy...
if(CDATA->s >= 0)
{
// I am the server, and my key is ok... so let's set server_keyfp and server_idfp
- strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
- strlcpy(crypto->server_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
+ dp_strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
+ dp_strlcpy(crypto->server_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_idfp));
crypto->server_issigned = pubkeys_havesig[CDATA->s];
if(!CDATA->id)
CLEAR_CDATA;
return Crypto_ServerError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify failed (authentication error)", "Authentication error");
}
- strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
+ dp_strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
crypto->client_issigned = status;
memset(crypto->client_idfp, 0, sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
double t = 0;
static double complain_time = 0;
const char *cnt;
- qboolean do_time = false;
- qboolean do_reject = false;
+ qbool do_time = false;
+ qbool do_reject = false;
char infostringvalue[MAX_INPUTLINE];
if(crypto_servercpupercent.value > 0 || crypto_servercpumaxtime.value > 0)
if(len_in > 5 && !memcmp(data_in, "d0pk\\", 5))
{
do_time = true;
- cnt = InfoString_GetValue(data_in + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
+ cnt = (InfoString_GetValue(data_in + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)) ? infostringvalue : NULL);
if(cnt)
if(!strcmp(cnt, "0"))
do_reject = true;
// check if we may perform crypto...
if(crypto_servercpupercent.value > 0)
{
- crypto_servercpu_accumulator += (realtime - crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime) * crypto_servercpupercent.value * 0.01;
+ crypto_servercpu_accumulator += (host.realtime - crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime) * crypto_servercpupercent.value * 0.01;
if(crypto_servercpumaxtime.value)
if(crypto_servercpu_accumulator > crypto_servercpumaxtime.value)
crypto_servercpu_accumulator = crypto_servercpumaxtime.value;
else
{
if(crypto_servercpumaxtime.value > 0)
- if(realtime != crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime)
+ if(host.realtime != crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime)
crypto_servercpu_accumulator = crypto_servercpumaxtime.value;
}
- crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = realtime;
+ crypto_servercpu_lastrealtime = host.realtime;
if(do_reject && crypto_servercpu_accumulator < 0)
{
- if(realtime > complain_time + 5)
+ if(host.realtime > complain_time + 5)
Con_Printf("crypto: cannot perform requested crypto operations; denial service attack or crypto_servercpupercent/crypto_servercpumaxtime are too low\n");
*len_out = 0;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
return CRYPTO_DISCARD;
}
-int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress)
+int Crypto_ClientParsePacket(const char *data_in, size_t len_in, char *data_out, size_t *len_out, lhnetaddress_t *peeraddress, const char *peeraddressstring)
{
crypto_t *crypto = &cls.crypto;
const char *string = data_in;
- const char *s;
D0_BOOL aes;
char *data_out_p = data_out;
D0_BOOL status;
}
else if (len_in >= 13 && !memcmp(string, "infoResponse\x0A", 13))
{
- s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 13, "d0_blind_id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
- if(s)
- Crypto_StoreHostKey(peeraddress, s, true);
+ if(InfoString_GetValue(string + 13, "d0_blind_id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
+ Crypto_StoreHostKey(peeraddress, infostringvalue, true);
return CRYPTO_NOMATCH;
}
else if (len_in >= 15 && !memcmp(string, "statusResponse\x0A", 15))
save = *p;
* (char *) p = 0; // cut off the string there
}
- s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 15, "d0_blind_id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
- if(s)
- Crypto_StoreHostKey(peeraddress, s, true);
+ if(InfoString_GetValue(string + 15, "d0_blind_id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
+ Crypto_StoreHostKey(peeraddress, infostringvalue, true);
if(p)
{
* (char *) p = save;
const char *p;
int i;
int clientid = -1, serverid = -1, wantserverid = -1;
- qboolean server_can_auth = true;
+ qbool server_can_auth = true;
char wantserver_idfp[FP64_SIZE+1];
int wantserver_aeslevel = 0;
- qboolean wantserver_issigned = false;
+ qbool wantserver_issigned = false;
// Must check the source IP here, if we want to prevent other servers' replies from falsely advancing the crypto state, preventing successful connect to the real server.
if (net_sourceaddresscheck.integer && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.connect_address))
- return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "challenge message from wrong server");
+ {
+ char warn_msg[128];
+
+ dpsnprintf(warn_msg, sizeof(warn_msg), "ignoring challenge message from wrong server %s", peeraddressstring);
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, warn_msg);
+ }
// if we have a stored host key for the server, assume serverid to already be selected!
// (the loop will refuse to overwrite this one then)
CDATA->s = serverid;
CDATA->c = clientid;
memset(crypto->dhkey, 0, sizeof(crypto->dhkey));
- strlcpy(CDATA->challenge, challenge, sizeof(CDATA->challenge));
+ dp_strlcpy(CDATA->challenge, challenge, sizeof(CDATA->challenge));
crypto->client_keyfp[0] = 0;
crypto->client_idfp[0] = 0;
crypto->server_keyfp[0] = 0;
if(clientid >= 0)
{
// I am the client, and my key is ok... so let's set client_keyfp and client_idfp
- strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
- strlcpy(crypto->client_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
+ dp_strlcpy(crypto->client_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_keyfp));
+ dp_strlcpy(crypto->client_idfp, pubkeys_priv_fp64[CDATA->c], sizeof(crypto->client_idfp));
crypto->client_issigned = pubkeys_havesig[CDATA->c];
}
// Must check the source IP here, if we want to prevent other servers' replies from falsely advancing the crypto state, preventing successful connect to the real server.
if (net_sourceaddresscheck.integer && LHNETADDRESS_Compare(peeraddress, &cls.connect_address))
- return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0pk\\ message from wrong server");
+ {
+ char warn_msg[128];
+
+ dpsnprintf(warn_msg, sizeof(warn_msg), "ignoring d0pk\\ message from wrong server %s", peeraddressstring);
+ return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, warn_msg);
+ }
- cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
- id = (cnt ? atoi(cnt) : -1);
- cnt = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue));
+ id = (InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "id", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)) ? atoi(infostringvalue) : -1);
+ cnt = (InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "cnt", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)) ? infostringvalue : NULL);
if(!cnt)
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0pk\\ message without cnt");
GetUntilNul(&data_in, &len_in);
if(CDATA->next_step != 1)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
- cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
+ cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, host.realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
- if((s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
- aes = atoi(s);
+ if(InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
+ aes = atoi(infostringvalue);
else
aes = false;
// we CANNOT toggle the AES status any more!
if(CDATA->next_step != 3)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
- cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
+ cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, host.realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if(!qd0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify(CDATA->id, data_in, len_in, msgbuf, &msgbuflen, &status))
{
return Crypto_ClientError(data_out, len_out, "d0_blind_id_authenticate_with_private_id_verify failed (server authentication error)");
}
- strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
+ dp_strlcpy(crypto->server_keyfp, pubkeys_fp64[CDATA->s], sizeof(crypto->server_keyfp));
if (!status && CDATA->wantserver_issigned)
{
CLEAR_CDATA;
if(CDATA->next_step != 5)
return Crypto_SoftClientError(data_out, len_out, va(vabuf, sizeof(vabuf), "Got d0pk\\cnt\\%s when expecting %d", cnt, CDATA->next_step));
- cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
+ cls.connect_nextsendtime = max(cls.connect_nextsendtime, host.realtime + 1); // prevent "hammering"
if(CDATA->s < 0) // only if server didn't auth
{
- if((s = InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue))))
- aes = atoi(s);
+ if(InfoString_GetValue(string + 4, "aes", infostringvalue, sizeof(infostringvalue)))
+ aes = atoi(infostringvalue);
else
aes = false;
if(CDATA->wantserver_idfp[0]) // if we know a host key, honor its encryption setting
projects / xonotic / darkplaces.git / blobdiff